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INTRODUCTION

[M]y son’s death cannot be in vain which is why I am begging
those in power to do something to help my brothers and sisters
on the bench. Now more than ever we need to identify a
solution that keeps the lives of federal judges private . . . . Let
me be clear and tell you firsthand; this is a matter of life or death.1
Those were some of the hair-raising words spoken by Judge Esther Salas for
the District of New Jersey after the murder of her only son, Daniel, and nearfatal shooting of her husband, Mark, at their family home in July 2020.2 The
tragedy that occurred to Judge Salas’s family was carried out by an anti-feminist
lawyer, Dan Hollander, while impersonating a FedEx delivery person. 3
Hollander was upset at Judge Salas for her ruling in a court case that challenged
the male-only military draft, and authorities believe that is why he attacked.4 In
addition to the attack on the Salas family, Hollander was also a murder suspect
in a different case involving a lawyer, and he had a list of other murder targets,
including another federal judge.5 To carry out this attack on the Salas family,
Hollander was able to access Judge Salas’s publicly available home address. 6
In the U.S., “there is no overarching framework, but rather episodic privacy
protections for limited domains and in certain circumstances.” 7 The sources of
U.S. privacy laws are evident in various federal statutes,8 a few state laws, and

1 Eyewitness News ABC7NY, Complete Statement from Judge Esther Salas After Son Killed,
Husband Shot, YOUTUBE (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4JPlcbW5aJs.
2 Id.
3 Esther Salas Case: Judge Salas Calls for Protecting Judges' Privacy, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53639299.
4 Id.
5 Id. (citing William K. Rashbaum, Misogynistic Lawyer Who Killed Judge’s Son Had List of
Possible
Targets,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
25,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/nyregion/roy-den-hollander-esther-salas-list.html.).
6 Esther Salas Case, supra note 3.
7 SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 3 (Anupam Chander et al. eds., 1st ed. 2008).
8 See e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C.
§§
2510-2523,
JUST.
INFO.
SHARING,
https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1285 (last visited Mar. 10, 2021)
(explaining that the ECPA “protects wire, oral, and electronic communications” while in
progress, in transit, and in computer storage); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (“COPPA”),
FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/rulemaking-regulatoryreform-proceedings/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule (last visited Mar. 10, 2021)
(detailing how COPPA “imposes certain requirements on operators of websites or online
services” involving the collection of personal information online and direction of services to
children under 13 years of age); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/gramm-leach-bliley-
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common law.9 For example, on the federal level, the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act of 1974 are companion statutes that serve
different purposes.10 These two statutes represent the attempt at a balance
between disclosure of information to the public and the safeguarding of
personally identifiable information (PII). While the Privacy Act of 1974 outlines
fair information practice to guide how federal agencies should maintain
individuals’ records,11 FOIA mandates federal agencies to disclose information
to the public unless it falls under one of the nine exemptions. 12 Because real
estate recording systems are within each individual state’s autonomy,13 every state
takes its own approach in formulating its laws related to the privacy of federal
judges’ home addresses.
Judge Salas asks for help because she knows the danger in making federal
judges’ lives public. Her family is not the first federal judge’s family to be targeted
by a shooter due to the easy access of their home address.14 And with the
publicization of federal judges’ real estate records, it is unlikely that it will be the
last. This fatal danger represents more than a general concern for federal judges’
safety; it represents a threat to the rule of law itself. If judges feel insecure in
their private spheres, their ability to administer justice impartially will be
undermined. Even the mere appearance of impropriety can serve as a threat to
the rule of law because of the importance of judicial independence. To mitigate
this risk, this Note argues that federal judges’ home addresses in their real estate
records should be recognized as private and protected PII, because action on the
federal level will result in blanket protection of federal judges and their families
nationwide with a consistent definition of PII as it pertains to federal judges’
home addresses.

act (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (describing the requirements imposed on financial institutions
to customers’ sensitive data).
9 SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE, supra note 7, at 3.
10 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA):
About the Privacy Act, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/foia/privacy.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2020); Todd
Walls, FOIA v. Privacy Act: A Comparison Chart, INT’L ASS’N. OF PRIVACY PROF. (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://iapp.org/resources/article/foia-v-privacy-act-a-comparison-chart/.
11 Frequently-Asked
Questions About the Privacy Act, ENV’T. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/privacy/frequently-asked-questions-about-privacy-act (last visited
Mar. 10, 2021).
12 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.foia.gov/faq.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2021).
13 Staff Author, What Real Estate Documents Need to be Recorded?, INVESTOPEDIA (June 23,
2020), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100214/what-real-estate-documentsneed-be-recorded.asp.
14 Judicial Security Legislation Stalls, Awaits Congressional Action in 2021, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 17,
2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/12/17/judicial-security-legislation-stalls-await
s -congressional-action-2021.
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This Note first provides a background on the threats and harms that federal
judges and their families have historically faced once individuals obtained access
to their home addresses. The background section of this Note further discusses
privacy law, the constitutionally recognized right to privacy, and the different
approaches to privacy taken by scholars. This section also delves into which
states provide privacy protections for federal judges’ home addresses in their real
estate records and how federal judges’ home addresses are disseminated in this
digital age. This section concludes with a discussion of the steps that have been
taken after the tragedy of Judge Salas’s family and what steps are yet to be taken,
including the passing of the Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act. The
analysis section of this Note weighs in on the implications of not providing this
privacy to federal judges as well as the implications of passing an amended
version of the bill before Congress. The best solution proposed in this section
is the privacy recognition of federal judges’ home addresses under federal law,
preferably as written in the original bill. Finally, this Note will conclude with an
emphasis on the importance of solving this problem not only for the safety of
federal judges and their families but also for the viability of this nation’s rule of
law and democracy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE NOT-SO-NEW DANGER TO FEDERAL JUDGES

In another chilling incident preceding the tragedy to Judge Salas’s family, a
gunman targeted U.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow’s family in 2005 after
getting ahold of her home address online.15 The gunman was a white
supremacist who Judge Lefkow held in contempt for continued trademarks
infringement.16 With forced entry, the gunman killed Judge Lefkow’s husband
and mother in their home.17 The gunman obtained their home address by
posting a message on the “White Aryan Resistance” website18 – their home
address could have easily been accessible through state public real estate records
and disseminated without restraints online.
What happened to Judges Lefkow’s and Salas’s families are not the only
targeted murders that have occurred at federal judges’ private homes. They just
happen to be the most recent. These types of murders date back to May 29,
1979 when U.S. District Judge John Wood was killed outside of his home before

15 David Heinzmann & Jeff Coen, Federal Judge's Family Killed, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 1, 2005,
2:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/chi-0503010123mar01-story.ht
ml.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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heading to work.19 Since the murder of Judge Wood, three other federal judges
have been murdered.20 These victims include U.S. District Judge John Wood,
U.S. District Judge Richard Daronco, and Federal Appeals Court Judge Robert
Vance.21 All of these federal judges were murdered at their publicized home
addresses by revengeful parties in cases before them. According to the U.S.
Marshals Service, security threats and inappropriate communications involving
federal judges increased from 926 incidents in 2015 to 4,449 incidents in 2019,
totaling almost a 500% uptick in incidents.22 Homes of federal judges and their
families are no longer a safe and private environment away from the public
courthouse.
B. THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Because the U.S. does not have a blanket privacy framework, the right to
privacy is recognized in various contexts 23 and is present throughout federal
statutes, state laws, and common law. 24 In addition, various legal scholars have
their own unique conceptualizations of the right to privacy.
1. Academic Recognition of the Right to Privacy
Before the Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy, former Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren advocated for the right to
privacy and were the first to write about it in a major legal article.25 In The Right
to Privacy published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890, Justice Brandeis and
Warren note that “[n]ow the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy
life,⎯the right to be let alone. . . .”26
Over time, scholars have developed varying conceptualizations of
information privacy as well as understanding what the law should protect.27 The
study of privacy law is highly contested academically, especially when it comes
19 Madalyn Mendoza, Forty Years Ago, U.S. District Judge Wood Assassinated in San Antonio by
Woody Harrelson's Father, MY SAN ANTONIO (May 29, 2019), https://www.mysanantonio
.com/news/local/article/Forty-years-ago-U-S-District-Judge-Wood-13904273.php.
20 Judicial Security Legislation Stalls, Awaits Congressional Action in 2021, supra note 14.
21 CNN Editorial Research, Judges Targeted Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 1, 2020, 3:59 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/us/judges-targeted-fast-facts/index.html.
22 Judicial Security Legislation Stalls, Awaits Congressional Action in 2021, supra note 14 (citing
Off. of Pub. Affs., Fact Sheet Judicial Security 2020, U.S. MARSHALS SERV. (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/judicial_sec.pdf).
23 SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE, supra note 7.
24 Id.
25 Leah Burrows, To Be Let Alone: Brandeis Foresaw Privacy Problems, BRANDEISNOW (July
24, 2013), https://www.brandeis.edu/now/2013/july/privacy.html.
26 Samuel D. Brandeis & Louis D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 2, 2 (1891).
27 MARK BURDON, DIGITAL DATA COLLECTION AND INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 101
(Cambridge Univ. Press et al. eds., 1st ed. 2020).
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to defining privacy from a legal perspective.28 When setting aside the differences
in scholars’ views, “information privacy, at its core, seeks to protect information
intrinsic to human beings and the lives they live.”29 A spectrum of perspectives
on privacy are contained within four key control conceptual themes that aim to
protect various aspects of information exchange or flow.30
The first control concept is individuals’ control over their personal
information and who may have access to such information.31 Stemming from
this “right to privacy” in the 1960s, the emergence of control concepts was due
to the arrival of computerized systems in the public and private sectors.32 In the
midst of these structural changes, Charles Fried, among others, stressed the link
between individual control over information and protection of privacy.33 He
argued that “[p]rivacy ... is the control we have over information about
ourselves.”34 Arthur Miller made a similar argument that privacy is “the
individual’s ability to control the flow of information concerning or describing
him.”35 Similar to Fried and Miller, although without the same terms of art, Alan
Westin called for “individual rights of control over personal information.” 36
Westin outlines four states of individual privacy: “solitude, intimacy, anonymity and
reserve.”37 He explains that it is necessary for individuals to have barriers and
reserve information from society.38
With the influence from Westin’s as well as Warren and Brandeis’ work,
control concepts have “morph[ed] into considerations of economic
transaction.”39 A cost-benefit analysis surrounds whether personal information
will be disclosed, containing a two-step threshold: (1) whether “the value of the
information when disclosed exceeds the value of the pure privacy preference of
the individual; and” (2) whether “permitting disclosure will not distort or
eliminate the information in future transactions.” 40 Because privacy is analogized
to ownership of property, it gives rise to the argument that individuals should

Id. at 102.
Id. at 101-02.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 103.
32 Id. at 106.
33 Id.
34 Id. (quoting Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475, 482 (1968)).
35 Id. (quoting Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New
Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1108 (1968)).
36 Id. at 107.
37 Id. (citing ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31-32 (Atheneum Press ed., 1967)).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 111 (citing LISA M. AUSTIN, Re-Reading Westin, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRES IN LAW
53, 69 (2019)).
40 Id. at 112 (quoting Richard Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic
Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2385 (1996)).
28
29
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and will be able to protect themselves once given the tools to protect their
information.41 If individuals have this control over information, then they will
be able to “think what they want to think and act without impediment.” 42
The second concept views information privacy as “protection of personal
autonomy” which is protection catered to individuals.43 Moreover, the third
concept “critiques the basis of information privacy as a sole protector of
individual control mechanisms” and also “[c]asts doubt about the focus on
individual informational spaces that enable personal autonomous growth.” 44
Lastly, the fourth concept focuses on the problem of power relations in the
structural foundation of information exchange.45
2. Judicial Recognition of the Right to Privacy
Former Justice Louis Brandeis, when serving on the Court, stuck to his
position expressed in The Right to Privacy by delivering a dissenting opinion in
Olmstead v. United States.46 Justice Brandeis became the first justice to read a
constitutional right to privacy out of the Fourth Amendment and to realize the
danger of technology.47 In Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in Olmstead, he
stated that “[p]rotection against such invasion of ‘the sanctities of a man’s home
and the privacies of life’ was in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by specific
language.”48
3. Statutory Recognition of the Right to Privacy
Beyond the different categorical and overlapping conceptualizations of
information privacy is the actual legal implementation of regulating it. The law
recognizes the requirements of data-collecting organizations and the use of
personal information in society in addition to the need for individual control. 49
In stark contrast to the control concepts, information privacy law takes the
approach of balancing individual protections against that organizational need for
41 Id. (citing CORIEN PRINS, PROPERTY AND PRIVACY: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES AND THE
COMMODIFICATION OF OUR IDENTITY, in Lucie M.C.R. Guibault & P.B. Hugenholtz, The
Future of the Public Domain 223 (Lucie M.C.R. Guibault et al. eds., 2006); ADAM D. MOORE,
INTANGIBLE PROPERTY: PRIVACY, POWER, AND CONTROL, in ADAM D. MOORE,
INFORMATION ETHICS: PRIVACY PROPERTY, AND POWER (Adam D. Moore ed., 2005)).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 103-04.
44 Id. at 104.
45 Id.
46 Burrows, supra note 25.
47 Id.
48 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1882)) (discussing the constitutionality of the government wiretapping private
citizens’ telephone conversations).
49 BURDON, supra note 27, at 140.
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the information.50 Information privacy regulation is further complicated by
jurisdictions conducting the balancing test differently51 and defining PII
incongruously from statute to statute.52 The different definitions, in turn, affect
the scope of application of privacy laws.53 These varying definitions of PII can
be best explained by the disjunctive structure of privacy laws in the United States.
C. THE PUBLICIZATION OF REAL ESTATE RECORDS

The disjunctive structure of American privacy laws is especially evident in
whether states will publicize an individual’s real estate records and even down to
which individual is entitled to some form of privacy. While FOIA carves out nine
exemptions of when federal agencies are not to disclose information to the
public,54 every state has its own version of a law modeled after FOIA.55 For
instance, the New Jersey Open Public Records Act (OPRA) allows for citizens
of New Jersey to request public documents of the state.56 OPRA even allows
for anonymous requests and limited exceptions.57 Real estate transactions are a
type of record in which individuals may request in various states. 58 In
comparison to other countries, “[n]o real estate recording system in the world is
more open than in the United States.” 59 States like Georgia have open records
requests processes for real estate records.60 Uniquely, other state legislatures like

Id.
Id. (outlining the cost-benefit analysis that is conducted in deciding whether personal
information will be disclosed).
52 Id. at 155.
53 Id. at 156.
54 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12 (providing a description of FOIA Exemption 6
which prohibits federal agencies to disclose information that would invade another individual’s
personal privacy).
55 Using Open Records and Freedom of Information Laws, GOOD JOBS FIRST,
https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/accountable-development/using-open-records-andfreedom-information-laws (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
56
New
Jersey
Open
Public
Records
Act,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/New_Jersey_Open_Public_Records_Act (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
57 Id.
58 Benny L. Kass, Like It or Not, Real Estate Transactions are Public Record, CHI. TRIB. (Sept.
2, 2015, 12:01 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/real-estate/sc-cons-0903-housingcounsel-20150902-column.html.
59 Emily Roscoe & Charles Szypszak, Privacy and Public Real Estate Records: Preserving Legacy
System Reliability Against Modern Threats, 49 URB. LAW. 355, 372 (2017) (citing Charles Szypszak,
Public Registries and Private Solutions: An Evolving American Real Estate Conveyance Regime, 24
WHITTIER L. REV. 663 (2003)).
60 Open Records Request, GEORGIA.GOV, https://gov.georgia.gov/contact-us/open-recordsrequest (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
50
51
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North Carolina, Idaho, and Florida have enacted avenues to safeguard judges,
among other public officials, from disclosure of their real estate records. 61
In states that have not enacted safeguards, anyone who purchases property
or takes out a mortgage is inadvertently and permanently publicizing the
information in those transactions’ documents. 62 Because public officials are
vulnerable to financial attacks through the use of their real estate records,
legislators have enacted laws to either prevent or address harm to public
officials.63 These financial harms can take the form of filing false liens or
improperly deeding government-owned property.64
A balancing test is conducted when considering the financial harms imposed
on public officials, such as judges. This test weighs the judges’ publicly accessible
real estate records against the decision of whether their records should be kept
private.65 On one side of the balancing test, public officials, like everyone, have
“a personal interest in being free from invasion of privacy and harassment,”
especially when they experience the harmful effects of false liens filed against
them because an individual felt wronged by them.66 A concern stemming from
the publicization of real estate records is that public officials “become less able
to undertake their public service duties if their time is consumed responding to
and coping with the aftereffects of [financial] harassment.”67 On the other side
of the balancing test, if there is less disclosure of real estate records through
“notice filing,” then it would go against the real estate system’s reliability.68 More
precisely, it would be contrary to the “settled legal principles that entitle someone
to rely on the public recordings as a complete statement of possible competing
claims.”69 It is important to note that this particular balancing test, however,
does not take into consideration the sorts of acts that result in physical or deadly
harm such as when individuals decide to commit violent acts against public
officials.
Aside from making real estate records private, the proffered options for
protection from the potential financial harms in a system that publicizes public
officials’ real estate records include routinely checking the registry or putting their

61 Roscoe & Szypszak, supra note 59, 374-76 (citing H.R. 477, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C.
2015)); IDAHO CODE § 19-5803 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 119.071(5)(i) (2017)).
62 Id. at 370–71.
63 Id. at 371 (citing Sovereign Citizens: A Growing Domestic Threat to Law Enforcement by the FBI's
Counterterrorism Analysis Section, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Sept. 1, 2011), https://
leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/sovereign-citizens-a-growing-domestic-threat-to-lawenforcement).
64 Id. at 358.
65 Id. at 369.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 384.
69 Id.
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titles in the name of an entity or trustee.70 The Chicago Bar Association’s Privacy
Task Force recommends to both state and federal judges to utilize land trusts if
their state allows for their existence.71 Land trusts, if available, permit a judge to
transfer the title of their real property to a trustee and most likely still reap the
benefits of ownership.72 However, this option may not be available to judges
across all states in which they may possibly reside or own real property,73 leading
to unequal and inconsistent application of protections across the nation.
D. THE ROLE PRIVATE ENTITIES PLAY

In addition to the disclosure of public officials’ personal information from
real estate transactions, private entities also play a role in facilitating the
publicization of their personal information. Private corporations buy and sell
individuals’ personal information “by buying or licensing data or scraping public
records.”74 There are thousands of data broker companies that are “trafficking”
data about individuals, and they make up a multibillion-dollar industry.75
Data brokers or people-search websites reveal individuals’ personal
information after payment with a credit card and “can be a goldmine for
doxxers,76 abusers, and stalkers.”77 For instance, in June 2013, Aaron Markus
Richardson fired a hunting rifle from less than 50 feet away at District Court
Judge Timothy Corrigan while Judge Corrigan was sitting at home. 78 The
shooter missed his head by 1.6 inches and had purchased the address online for

Id. at 387.
The Chi. Bar Ass’n & The John Marshall Law Sch., Protecting Your Personal Privacy,
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 6 (Oct. 2006), https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/
OJFN/resources/Privacy.pdf.
72 Id.
73 See Dave Roos, How Land Trusts Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://money.how
stuffworks.com/personal-finance/financial-planning/land-trusts.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2021) (explaining that only 9 U.S. states – Illinois, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, North Dakota,
Virginia, Arizona, California, and Ohio – permit the use of land trusts).
74 Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here Are the Data Brokers Quietly Buying and Selling
Your Personal Information, FAST CO., (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/9
0310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietly-buying-and-selling-your-personal-information.
75 Steve Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, 60 MINUTES, (Mar. 9, 2014)
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-selling-your-personal-information/.
76 See dox, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dox (last
visited Mar. 17, 2021) (defining “dox” as a transitive verb meaning “to publicly identify or
publish private information about (someone) especially as a form of punishment or revenge.”)
77 Melendez & Pasternack, supra note 74.
78 Timothy J. Corrigan, Florida-based Judge Once Targeted by Gunman Says Congress Needs to
Provide Better Security | Commentary, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 4, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://
www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/guest-commentary/os-op-federal-judges-need-bettersecurity-column-20201204-mtsfvyh65nbo3mhsbly7s5tlaa-story.html.
70
71
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less than $2.00!79 These companies are collecting PII which are then compiled
into dossiers that they sell with practically no oversight.80 Data brokers
participate in the act of doxing, which is “the practice of publicly releasing
someone’s personal information without their consent.” 81 While collecting and
selling individuals’ data is legal, states like Vermont and California have enacted
legislation to put restrictions on data brokers.82 However, such restrictions on
data brokers remain unregulated for the most part. 83
E. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE

Recently, after Judge Salas’s family and officers at two federal courthouses
were attacked, the Judiciary sent two letters – a legislative request and a funding
request – to Congress. These letters served as a “call to congressional leaders
for a series of safety members ‘to protect the safety of the public at our nation’s
courthouses.’”84 The Judiciary not only wants to prevent violence at federal
courthouses, but it also urges Congress to fund measures to protect federal
judges at their homes. 85 Congress previously appropriated money for home
security for federal judges in 2005 after the attack on Judge Lefkow’s family, but
those alarm systems are now outdated.86
The Judiciary requested funding to install modern home intrusion detection
systems in federal judges’ homes, hire 1,000 additional deputy U.S. Marshals, and
upgrade exterior courthouse security cameras.87 In addition, the Judiciary
proposed that Congress enact a law to restrict the distribution of federal judges’
PII with their home addresses and initiate the monitoring of the internet for
threats and posts of their PII.88 The Judiciary’s proposed law also sought to
eliminate the sunset provision in 5 U.S.C. app. § 105(b)(3)(E). 89 The reasoning
for this proposal stemmed from the lack of permanent redaction authority of
Id.
Kroft, supra note 75.
81 Louise Matsakis, The WIRED Guide to Your Personal Data (and Who Is Using It), WIRED
(Feb. 15, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-datacollection/.
82 Id.; see generally Computer & Internet Law – Criminal Offenses: Third Party Disclosure of Personal
Data, LEXIS PLUS (Apr. 2019), https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/5ae8ae74-1372-41619db7-39ad7f10a5cb/?context=1530671 (providing an overview of state laws on third-party
disclosure of personal data through a 50-state survey).
83 Matsakis, supra note 81.
84 Judiciary Steps Up Calls to Enact Security Measures, U.S. CTS., (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/09/22/judiciary-steps-calls-enact-security-measures.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
79
80
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federal judges’ financial disclosure reports, allowing for individuals with grudges
against the judges to learn about their sensitive information, such as their home
addresses.90
The movement of increased appropriation of money to the U.S. Marshals
Service and enhanced personal protection of threatened judges in 2005 was first
championed by Judge Lefkow.91 In 2010, Governor Pat Quinn of Illinois signed
into law a Judicial Privacy Improvement Act in honor of Judge Lefkow’s family.92
This Act ensures that federal judges’ driver’s licenses and car registrations are
traced to the courthouse and not their family home.93 This Act also recognizes
judges’ home addresses as PII.94
Following Judge Salas’s tragedy, Judge Lefkow stood behind Judge Salas and
her effort to pave the way for greater judicial security.95 On November 20, 2020,
Governor Phil Murphy of New Jersey signed legislation (A1649) known as
Daniel’s Law in honor of Judge Salas’s late son, Daniel.96 New Jersey’s Daniel’s
Law implemented several informational privacy measures for active and retired
federal judges by amending the Open Public Records Act (OPRA). 97 Daniel’s
Law excludes the home address of any active or retired judge and prohibits the
government, individuals, and businesses from knowingly publishing on the
internet or otherwise publicizing the home address or unpublished phone
number of any active or retired judge.98 In addition, Daniel’s Law permits active
or retired judges to request for their own or their immediate family’s publicized
home address or unpublished phone number to be removed.99 Daniel’s Law also
90 Letters from James C. Duff, Secretary, U.S. Courts, to Lindsey Graham, Chairman, U.S.
Senate, and Jerold Nadler, Chairman, U.S. Senate (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/letter_to_congress_re_judicial_security_legislative_request.
pdf.
91 Julie Unruh, Turning Family Tragedy into Hope for Others: Federal Judges Work to Make the
Bench a Safer Place, WGN9 (Dec. 2, 2020, 8:53 PM), https://wgntv.com/news/chicagonews/turning-family-tragedy-into-hope-for-others-federal-judges-work-to-make-the-bencha-safer-place/.
92 Id.
93 Id.; Joe Harris, Judges Get Privacy | Law in Illinois, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Aug. 1,
2012), https://www.courthousenews.com/judges-get-privacylaw-in-illinois/.
94 Id.
95 See generally Joan Lefkow, Op-ed: Judge Joan Lefkow: My Husband and Mother Were Killed by
Someone with a Vendetta. Federal Protection is Essential., CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 9, 2020, 12:26 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-federal-judges-threatslefkow-20201209-4vypwpafvfb35jy7x5tjkhlutm-story.html (urging Congress to enact Daniel’s
Law and hoping that her and Judge Salas are “the last federal judges who lose members of
[their] family to violence as a result of [their] service to our country”).
96
Governor Murphy Signs “Daniel’s Law,” NJ.GOV (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562020/approved/20201120b.shtml.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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extends informational privacy protection to active and retired prosecutors and
law enforcement officers.100
Following the passage of New Jersey’s Daniel’s Law, a bipartisan, federal
version of Daniel’s Law was introduced to the 116th United States Congress for
a bicameral vote to enhance judicial security by focusing on defining and
protecting federal judges’ PII.101 As a follow-up to the Judicial Conference’s
request to Congress in September 2020 to protect judges at their homes and
courthouses, the Judiciary issued another statement, but this time calling for the
passage of this bill.102 Additionally, Attorney General Gurbir S. Grewal and fiftyone attorney generals supported and urged for the passage of the bill in a letter
to Congress, which amounted to a formal endorsement of the bill by the National
Association of Attorneys General.103
However, on December 16, 2020, the bill did not obtain unanimous consent
required to pass in the Senate, and U.S. Senator Rand Paul (R-Kentucky) blocked
the bill and sought an amendment to include similar protections for members of
Congress.104 Coupled with calling for similar protections for members of
Congress in addition to the Judiciary, the amendment also seeks to eliminate the
right to private action and punitive damages.105 Senator Menendez voiced his
concern regarding Senator Rand’s amendment, calling it “a poison pill.” 106
Id.
Id.; see generally Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2020, S.4711, 116th
Cong. § 7 (2020) (as referred to the Senate Judiciary, Sept. 24, 2020) (containing text of the
federal Daniel’s Law); see also Elaine Silvestrini, Push Is on to Increase Protection for Federal Judges,
LEGAL EXAM’R (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.legalexaminer.com/legal/push-is-on-toincrease-protection-for-federal-judges/ (explaining the Daniel Anderl Judicial Security Act
was co-authored by U.S. senators, Bob Menendez and Cory Booker (both D-NJ) and was
originally co-sponsored by Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC), chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and by the committee’s ranking member, Diane Feinstein (D-CA)).
102 Judiciary Calls for Passage of Security Legislation, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 4, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/12/04/judiciary-calls-passage-security-legislation; see
also Judiciary Steps Up Calls to Enact Security Measures, supra note 84 (enclosing two letters that
were sent to Congress by James C. Duff, secretary of the Judiciary Conference of the United
States, and by Judge David W. McKeague, chair of the Judicial Conference’s Committee on
Judicial Security).
103 AG Grewal Leads 51 AGs in Backing Federal Version of “Daniel’s Law” to Protect Judges and
their Families, INSIDER NJ (Dec. 14, 2020, 1:07 PM), https://www.insidernj.com/pressrelease/ag-grewal-leads-51-ags-backing-federal-version-daniels-law-protect-judges-families/.
104 Judicial Security Legislation Stalls, Awaits Congressional Action in 2021, supra note 14; see also
Nikita Biryukov, Rand Paul Blocks Federal Daniel’s Law: Menendez Said Rand Paul’s Amendments
Would Render Law Useless, N.J. GLOBE (Dec. 16, 2020, 5:31 PM),
https://newjerseyglobe.com/congress/kentucky-senator-blocks-federal-daniels-law/
(explaining the proposed amendment is supported with reminders of the attempted
assassinations of Representatives Gabby Giffords (D-AZ) in 2011 and Steve Scalise (R-LA) in
2017).
105 Biryukov, supra note 104 (including a video in which the amendments are described).
106 Id.
100
101
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Subsequent to the bill’s failure to pass, James C. Duff, Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, stated that the Judiciary will “redouble
[their] efforts to get this legislation enacted in the new Congress.” 107
III. ANALYSIS
Members of Congress should not seek any amendments and instead pass the
Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2020 as originally written. 108
If members of Congress want information privacy protection for themselves,
then they have every opportunity to write a bill for that purpose and send it
through the bicameralism and presentment processes. This bill was drafted
strictly in honor of Judge Salas’s son, Daniel, and specifically serves the purpose
of safeguarding current and former federal judges and their families. It is
imperative to pass this bill without an amendment in the new Congress, because
“every day [Congress] fail[s] to act leaves our federal judges and our democracy
in danger.”109 Additionally, not only would modifying the bill according to
Senator Paul’s amendment take away from the purpose of the bill as originally
drafted by addressing both the judicial and legislative branches, but it would strip
the bill of its deterrent effect since the amendment eliminates the right to private
action and punitive damages.110 Furthermore, the inclusion of the legislative
branch in this bill would likely be more problematic than the simpler, alternative
option of Congress passing a privacy bill specifically for members of Congress.
These problems would arise from an appearance of exclusivity in a system of
three separate but equal branches of government. Thus, the passage of the
original bill would be the first step in the right direction to ensure federal judges’
privacy in a digital age.
A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NONACTION

1. Impartial Administration of Justice
It is crucial to protect the privacy of federal judges’ home addresses through
the passing of a federal law to ensure the impartial administration of justice. If
federal judges do not feel protected, then they may rule in a manner that places

Judicial Security Legislation Stalls, Awaits Congressional Action in 2021, supra note 14.
Its name may need to be modified to include “2021” if it is to be passed in the 117 th
Congress.
109 Id. (quoting James C. Duff, Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
110 See Andrew Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75.1 ALB. L. REV. 181, 193 (2011) (asserting
that “it seems safe to say that [punitive damages’] deterrent effect cannot be seriously
questioned,” regardless of the controversy surrounding the topic); see also Biryukov, supra
note 104 (describing the effect of the proposed amendment on punitive damages).
107
108
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their safety over the impartial administration of justice.111 For instance, a judge
may feel inclined to rule in favor of a party out of fear of retaliation. When
judges are “subject to influence or intimidation by corrupt officials, groups, or
individuals,” the public will lack confidence in the Judiciary,112 and that directly
threatens the legitimacy of the Judiciary.
During the Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearing following the death of
Judge Lefkow’s family, Senator Arlen Specter stated that “[t]he capability of the
[J]udiciary to determine the rule of law without fear or favor is an indispensable
prerequisite in our democratic society.”113 “The public must perceive that [federal
judges] are fair and impartial if the rule of law is to survive.”114 This concern was
once again echoed by Senator Menendez and by James C. Duff, Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.115 If citizens do not trust the Judiciary,
then citizens “will lack confidence that resort to judicial process will achieve a
just resolution of their conflicts.”116 An independent and legitimized Judiciary
can be realized through the assurance of the safety and security of judges.117
On top of the threat to American democracy and the viability of the rule of
law, any self-interested administration of justice directly contradicts the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges.118 Specifically, Canon 1 and Canon 2 provide
that a judge “[s]hould [u]phold the [i]ntegrity and [i]ndependence of the
Judiciary” and “[s]hould [a]void [i]mpropriety and the [a]ppearance of
[i]mpropriety in all [a]ctivities.”119 Whether or not a judge consciously intends
to do so, the potential threat to their life or their family’s life due to their ruling
111 See BURDON, supra note 27, at 112 (explaining that if individuals have control over their
information, then they can “think what they want to think and act without impediment”).
112 J. Clifford Wallace, An Essay on Independence of the Judiciary: Independence from What and
Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 246 (2001).
113 Protecting Federal Judges, C-SPAN (May 18, 2005), https://www.c-span.org/video
/?186776-1/protecting-federal-judges#.
114 See Paul L. Friedman, Threats to Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, AM. BAR ASS’ N
(Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/committee-onamerican-judicial-system/in-the-news/threats-to-judicial-independence-and-rule-of-law/
(explaining the importance of judicial independence, or in other words, the insulation of
decisions from external pressures and personal interests).
115 Biryukov, supra note 104 (stating that “[a]n independent judiciary in which judges can
render decisions without fear of retribution and violence is essential to the integrity of our
democracy . . . [i]ndeed, the idea that any judge at any level of government could be intimidated
undermines the very concept of the rule of law”).
116 Wallace, supra note 112.
117 Id.
118 See generally Code of Conduct for United States Judges, U.S. CTS., https://www.
uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges (last visited Mar. 10,
2021) (outlining the Code of Conduct for United States Judges which “includes the ethical
canons that apply to federal judges and provides guidance on their performance of official
duties and engagement in a variety of outside activities”).
119 Id.
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in a controversial case may convey the impression that someone influenced the
judge’s decision depending on a case’s outcome. Even the appearance of
impropriety that a judge ruled in accordance with outside influence works against
the promotion of “public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
[J]udiciary,” which the Canons recognize as being “indispensable to justice” in
our nation.120 Thus, either the appearance of impropriety or actual impropriety
due to threats to federal judges’ and their families’ lives directly impacts the
integrity and independence of the Judiciary as well as the rule of law. That is why
it is imperative that a federal law defining and protecting federal judges’ home
addresses as PII – preferably the unamended bill proposed to the 116th Congress
– is passed as soon as possible.
2. Detrimental Delay
Every day, every week, and every month that Congress waits to enact a federal
law to identify and protect federal judges’ home addresses as PII creates more
room for another federal judge or federal judge’s family member to be harmed
in a digital age of heightened polarization.121 President Donald Trump has
openly criticized federal judges’ decisions via social media.122 The result of
President Trump’s criticism of federal judges amplified violent and deadly threats
to federal judges and online publicization of their home addresses. 123 Although
President Trump has been permanently banned from Twitter124 and is no longer
president, polarization online is ever so present and is likely not going away any
Id.
See generally Darrell West & Fred Dews, After the Insurrection, Ideas to Tackle Polarization in
America, BROOKINGS (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/after-theinsurrection-ideas-to-tackle-polarization-in-america/ (describing the nation as “divided and
on edge” following the insurrection of the U.S. Capitol); Tyler Sonnemaker, 11 Experts Explain
How Our Digital World is Fueling Polarization, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2020, 2:49 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-internet-social-media-fuel-polarization-americafacebook-twitter-youtube-2020-12 (informing how technology has played “a significant role”
in this nation’s polarization).
122 See In His Own Words: The President’s Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/his-own-words-presidentsattacks-courts (last updated Feb. 14, 2020) (outlining the pattern of attacks that President
Trump has made on judges and the courts after rulings he opposed).
123 See Judges Raise Alarm as Personal Threats Intensify, Amplified by Social Media, AM. BAR ASS’ N
(Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2019
/08/judges-raise-alarm-as-personal-threats-intensify--amplified-by-s/
(revealing
that
following Judge James Robart’s blocking of President Trump’s first “travel ban” and before
he even left the courtroom, people published his “name, photo, address and phone number
on the internet, along with his wife’s name, phone number and business address” online and
then he experienced even more frightening threats when President Trump criticized Judge
Robart over Twitter).
124
Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html.
120
121
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time soon.125 The increase in polarization and its conveyance over digital
platforms poses a serious danger to federal judges, especially when their homes
addresses are easily accessible and their roles have been viewed as becoming
“increasingly politicized.”126 As long as federal judges’ home addresses remain
public information in a polarized and digital age, federal judges will be at greater
risk of harm. Thus, it is critical to classify and protect federal judges’ home
addresses as PII through federal law, without any more delays.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF SENATOR RAND PAUL’S
AMENDMENT

1. Deterrent Effect of Damages
Congress should enact the original federal bill without the proposed
amendment, because damages are essential to deter data brokers from
publicizing federal judges’ PII. Senator Menendez expressed his concern after
reading Senator Paul’s amendment to the bill which included a barrier to legal
actions that judges would be able to take against data providers who violate the
bill.127 In Senator Menendez’s rejection of the proposed amendment, he stated
that “[w]ithout the threat of some damages, there’s little incentive for a data
broker to remove the personally identifying information of a judge and his or her
family.”128 The original bill provides redress and penalties for federal judges
whose PII was made public in violation of the bill, including a private right of
action in a court with jurisdiction and possible damages if the judge prevails in
their action.129 It states that a prevailing judge shall be awarded damages in an
amount “[no] greater than 3 times the actual damages incurred” and “not less
than $10,000.”130
There is academic research to support Senator Menendez’s fear that there
would be a lack of deterrence if these damages are eliminated, although this topic
is highly contested amongst legal scholars.131 Future civil liability has a deterrent
125 See Caroline Dade, Experts Say Trump’s Twitter Ban Could Affect Political Polarization,
WKOW (Jan. 10, 2021, 10:42 PM), https://wkow.com/2021/01/10/experts-say-trumpstwitter-ban-could-affect-political-polarization/ (stating that there will be even more
polarization once politicians and their supporters who encourage violence leave “mainstream
social media platforms” for less regulated platforms like Parler).
126 Ben Kesslen, The Attack on Judge Salas’ Family Highlights Concerns over Judicial Safety, NBC
NEWS (July 21, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/attack-judgesalas-family-highlights-concerns-over-judicial-safety-n1234476.
127 Biryukov, supra note 104.
128 Id.
129 Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2020, S.4711, 116th Cong. § 7 (2020)
(as referred to the Senate Judiciary, Sept. 24, 2020).
130 Id.
131 See generally Popper, supra note 110 (weighing the arguments for and against the
deterrent effects of damages and arguing how damages do indeed deter unwanted behavior).
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effect on actors because of how human beings rationally react to the potential of
punishment.132 By offering statutory damages, the bill puts a floor on damages
and sets a range from $10,000 to discretionary treble damages. 133 Following a
plain reading of the statutory damages provided in the bill, the damages can be
categorized as compensatory and punitive.134 A court would be statutorily
granted135 the discretion to award compensatory damages in the amount of the
actual damages incurred by the judge. A court may also award damages in an
amount of three times the actual damages which serves a punitive purpose in
addition to compensating the judge. It is evident that the bill intends to punish
the wrongdoer by setting a floor of a minimum recoverable amount of $10,000
if the judge prevails in their action.136 When implemented, punitive damages aim
at “(1) punishing outrageous conduct and (2) deterring its future occurrence.”137
Even the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that “punitive damages are
damages . . . awarded against a person . . . to deter him and other like him from
similar conduct in the future.”138
Further, an award of multiple damages, as provided in this bill, may be able
to fully compensate and better deter a person, business, or association from
committing a wrongdoing to a judge, as opposed to no damages at all or ordinary
compensatory and punitive damages.139 The Supreme Court has also recognized
132 Id. at 186 (citing C.B. FERSTER & B.F. SKINNER, SCHEDULES OF REINFORCEMENT 7-11
(Julie S. Vargas ed., 1957); B.F. SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM 53, 68-71 (1974) (claiming
rational beings act to avoid pain or punishment).
133 See Geoffery S. Stewart & Miriam S. Weiler, Emerging Issues in Statutory Damages, JONES
DAY (July 2011), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2011/07/emerging-issues-instatutory-damages (giving background information on statutory damages); see also Treble
Damages, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/treble_damages (last visited
Mar. 10, 2021) (defining treble damages as damages awarded by the court that are three times
the amount of the plaintiff’s actual damages).
134 See generally Damages, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/damages
(last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (defining compensatory damages as damages “intended to
compensate the injured party for loss or injury” and punitive damages as damages “awarded
to punish a wrongdoer”).
135 See generally Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2020, S.4711, 116th
Cong. § 7 (2020) (as referred to the Senate Judiciary, Sept. 24, 2020) (explaining which damages
a court may award to compensate a judge).
136 Stewart & Weiler, supra note 133 (stating that “many statutory damages law have a
punitive purpose”).
137 Roseanna Sommers, The Psychology of Punishment and the Puzzle of Why Tortfeasor Death
Defeats Liability for Punitive Damages, 124 YALE L.J. 1295 (2015) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 908 (1979); 1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:12 (2d ed. 2014); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive
Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1393, 1428-29 (1993); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 76 (1982)).
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
139 Stephen J. Shapiro, Overcoming Under-Compensation and Under-Deterrence in Intentional Tort
Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages the Best Remedy?, 62 MERCER L. REV. 449, 450, 498 (2011)
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that multiple damages punish, deter, and compensate. 140 Thus, it is pertinent for
Congress to pass the bill as originally drafted with the private right of action and
multiple damages in order to increase the chances that actors are deterred from
intentionally publicizing judges’ PII.
2. Losing its Meaning
Although Senator Paul calls the amendment a “very minor request” that
“would not change anything or lessen anything about the bill,”141 the amendment
would do just that. Beyond the effects on deterrence, if the amendment were to
be implemented with protections for members of Congress, the bill would lose
its symbolic and practical meaning. The Daniel Anderl Judicial Security Act was
drafted and presented in the name of Daniel, Judge Salas’s late son who was
murdered when a man appeared at her home and shot Daniel and her husband. 142
Including protections for the legislative branch in the bill alongside the
protections for the judicial branch would completely contradict the name of the
bill, and any renaming of the bill would strip the attention away from honoring
Judge Salas’s son, Daniel.
3. Complications Amongst the Three Branches of Government
Even though the amendment to the bill calls for the extension of protections
to the legislative branch, this inclusivity would in turn create an appearance of
exclusivity in a system of three separate but equal branches of government. Since
the judicial branch is not of more importance than the legislative or executive
branches,143 adding protections for the legislative branch in the bill would then
leave room for an argument that members of the executive branch should also
be entitled to protections. Former members of the executive branch have also
received deadly threats to their homes, 144 so it could be argued that they too
(explaining that (i) in actuality, compensatory damages do not always fully compensate the
plaintiff or adequately deter the defendant and others from intentional tortious conduct; (ii)
punitive damages do not always deter intentional wrongdoings of less malicious nature; and
(iii) multiple damages are a better alternative since “[a] party will be less willing to engage in
intentionally tortious conduct if he knows he will have to pay for the harm”).
140 Id. at 476 (citing Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575-76
(1982)).
141 See Biryukov, supra note 104 (recording Senator Paul’s discussion of the amendment’s
impact in the legislative session’s video starting at 13 minutes, 51 seconds).
142 Lefkow, supra note 95.
143
Separation of Powers in Action – U.S. v. Alvarez, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/separation-powersaction-us-v-alvarez (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (stating that “[t]he U.S. Constitution establishes
three separate but equal branches of government”).
144 See, e.g., Jonathan Dienst, Marc Santia, & Jennifer Millman, Pipe Bombs Sent to Hillary
Clinton, Obama, CNN, Holder, Waters and George Soros are Linked, Sources Say, NBC N.Y. (Oct.
25, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/bomb-hillary-clinton-house-
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should be included in the bill alongside former federal judges to have their home
addresses protected as PII.
The bill identifies current, senior, recalled, or retired federal judges’ home
addresses as PII and seeking to provide privacy protection measures.145 It also
aims to establish a new threat management capability with the U.S. Marshals
Service and other relevant Federal law enforcement and security agencies.146
Considering the inclusion of the legislative branch alone or both the legislative
and executive branches would call for Congress to reevaluate the appropriation
and facilitation of the new threat management capability. Congress would have
to authorize the appropriation of even more funds to the agencies that protect
the legislative and executive branches. While it is feasible to single out which
security agencies are responsible for protecting the members of the judicial147
and legislative branches,148 it becomes more complex in the executive branch due
to the various departments within it.149
The proposed extension of protection to the executive branch would also
open the floor to a debate as to which members of the executive branch are
deserving of protection.150 The executive branch contains many high-profile and
well-known employees aside from the heads of the fifteen executive

chappaqua-new-york-george-soros/542083/ (reporting that incidents of expositive devices
were attempted to be mailed to the homes of former executive branch members, including
former President Barack Obama & First Lady Michelle Obama, former Vice President Joe
Biden and Second Lady Dr. Jill Biden, former President Bill Clinton and First Lady/Secretary
of State).
145 Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2020, S.4711, 116th Cong. § 7 (2020) (as referred
to Senate Judiciary, Sept. 24, 2020).
146 Id.
147 Judicial Security, U.S. MARSHALS SERV., https://www.usmarshals.gov/judicial/ (last
visited Mar. 10, 2021) (stating that the United States Marshals Service protects members of
the federal judiciary).
148 The Department, U.S. CAPITOL POLICE, https://www.uscp.gov/the-department (last
visited Mar. 10, 2021) (explaining that the United States Capitol Police is a federal law
enforcement agency that protects the Congress and Members of Congress).
149 See Nicholas Fandos, A Who’s Who List of Agencies Guarding the Powerful, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/us/politics/secret-serviceprotection-washington.html (informing that the protection of top government officials within
the executive branch, ranging from the President to the head of the Environmental Protection
Agencies, involves “more than a dozen federal agencies and offices”).
150 Our Government: The Executive Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www
.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/the-executive-branch/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2021);
see also Martha Joynt Kumar, Assistants to the President: White House Top-Tier Staff Turnover During
the
First
17
Months,
WHITE
HOUSE
TRANSITION
PROJECT
1,
2,
http://www.whitehousetransitionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Assistants_to_
the _President_Turnover_6-30-2018.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (providing that “[t]here
are three levels of commissioned officers at the White House: Assistant to the President,
Deputy Assistant to the President, Special Assistant to the President”).
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departments.151 There is also greater turnover for some members in the
executive branch,152 as opposed to the members of Congress who are elected to
serve their term and federal judges who are appointed for life.153 It may be
systematically and financially straining to implement protections for the
executive branch’s commissioned officers with a higher turnover rate. Given all
of likely future complications with the executive branch if the legislative branch
is included, the bill should focus solely on the judicial branch.
Even if protections of the legislative branch were implemented in the bill
without any complaints of exclusion from the executive branch, it would not be
institutionally viable. The security agency of the legislative branch, the Capitol
Police, may need to undergo investigation and reform before there is any
discussion about expanding their powers.154 There is a stark difference between
categorizing legislative branch members’ home addresses as PII and assigning
Capitol Police the responsibility to protect members of Congress at their homes
and their PII.155 Following the January 6, 2021 insurrection at the Capitol,
questions remain about whether police assisted in the insurrection.156 While
members of Congress have had their homes publicized157 and their security

Id.
Kumar, supra note 150, at 2-6.
153
See
generally
Article
I,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (outlining
Article I of the U.S. Constitution which designates two-year terms for Representatives and sixyear terms for Senators); see also Article III, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleiii (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (providing
Article III of the U.S. Constitution which states that “judges, both of the supreme and inferior
courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour”).
154 Sarah Ferris, Kyle Cheney, & Melanie Zanona, ‘Hate in Their Heart’” Lawmakers Fear
More Violence After Capitol Attacks, POLITICO (Jan. 11, 2021, 9:26 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/11/lawmakers-fear-violence-captiol-riots-457868
(quoting Representative Tim Ryan who oversees the funding for Capitol Police and said that
“[w]e have to begin to re-establish trust with the United States Capitol Police because of what
happened” and “[t]he trust may be difficult to regain”).
155 Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2020, S.4711, 116th Cong. § 7 (2020)
(as referred to Senate Judiciary, Sept. 24, 2020).
156 Marshall Cohen, Questions swirl around possible ‘insider’ help for Capitol attack, CNN (Jan. 14,
2021, 10:46 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/13/politics/capitol-insurrection-insiderhelp/index.html (reporting that at least two U.S. Capitol Police officer have been suspended
for playing a role and at least two more are under investigation); see also Peter Nickeas, Annie
Grayer, & Ryan Nobles, 2 Capitol Police officers suspended and at least 10 more under investigation for
alleged
roles
in
riot,
CNN
(Jan.
11,
2021,
10:20
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/11/politics/capitol-police-officers-suspended-timryan/index.html (explaining that one of the suspended police officers took a selfie with one
of the mob members while another wore a “Make America Great Again” hat and directed
people in the mob around the Capitol building).
157 See, e.g., William Skipworth, FACT CHECK: Protesters at Sen. Josh Hawley’s home were
disruptive
but
not
threatening
or
violent,
MISSOURIAN
(Jan.
9,
2021),
151
152
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compromised at the Capitol, none of the attacks on members of Congress that
Senator Paul cited in his objection to the bill occurred at their homes. 158
Understandably, members of Congress have a reason to be fearful for their lives
and to want their home addresses to be defined as PII. It is, however, troubling
to extend the responsibility of protection by the Capitol Police to the homes of
members of Congress and their PII if there are insurrectionist ties159 and security
flaws within the agency.160 This bill intends to appropriate funds to the United
States Marshals Services to “develop a monitoring, collection, and analytical
capability to share relevant information leveraged from the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts and partnered law enforcement and security
agencies.”161 Still, the Capitol Police cannot currently be expected to fulfill that
obligation for members of Congress as it has apparently failed to share critical
security information with other agencies such as the FBI.162 Thus, including the

https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/politifact_missouri/fact-check-protesters-atsen-josh-hawley-s-home-were-disruptive-but-not-threatening-or/article_9630f438-520911eb-bfa5-2bcc479 ee6d4.html (detailing a peaceful demonstration in front of Senator
Hawley’s Vienna, Virginia home by activist group, ShutDownDC, protesting his objection to
certain electoral votes); but cf. Jamie Gangel, Marshall Cohen, & Annie Grayer, Members of
Congress Fear for Their Lives and Security After Deadly Riot, Sources Say, CNN (Jan. 15, 2021, 9:01
AM),
https://www
.cnn.com/2021/01/14/politics/capitol-hill-lawmakers-securityconcerns/index.html (quoting Republican Rep. Dusty Johnson of South Dakota saying that
“[his] address, a picture of [his] home where [his] family lives was posted on kind of an antiDusty Facebook page” and he has received threats against his life and safety).
158 Stacey Barchenger & Tenton Bureau, Bill to Protect Judges’ Info Blocked by Senator, Asks for
Congressmen to Be Protected, Too, MY CENTRAL JERSEY (Dec. 17, 2020, 1:21 PM),
https://www.mycentraljersey.com/story/news/politics/2020/12/17/nj-effort-protectjudges-blocked-congress-rand-paul-esther-salas/3939294001/ (distinguishing that Rep.
Gabby Giffords and others were shot in a parking lot during a constituent event and Rep.
Steven Scalise during a baseball game while Judge Salas’s family was shot in their private
home).
159 Nickeas et al., supra note 156 (noting that skills that law enforcement officers are trained
to use could be helpful to an extremist mob).
160 See Carole D. Leonnig, Capitol Police Intelligence Report Warned Three Days Before Attack
That ‘Congress Itself’ Could Be Targeted, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2021, 7:43 PM)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/capitol-police-intelligencewarning/2021/01/15/c8b50744-5742-11eb-a08b-f1381ef3d207_story.html (revealing how
the Capitol Police intelligence report warning that Congress could be targeted “does not
appear to have been shared widely with other law enforcement agencies”); see also Dennis
Wagner, ‘Failure of Imagination’: National Guard Absence at Capitol Riots Shows Lack of Preparation,
Distrust After Heavy-Handed BLM Response, USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/01/15/national-guards-no-showcapitol-riots-shows-lack-preparation/4169368001/ (stating that although the Capitol Police
force “has been beefed up and professionalized over the years in response to [other acts of
violence],” the force on January 6, 2021 “seemed ‘overwhelmed and underprepared’”).
161 Leonnig, supra note 160.
162 Id.
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legislative branch in the bill and entrusting the Capitol Police in its current state
with enforcing PII protections would be a grave mistake.
Polarization in Congress has made passing bills extremely hard, and so
members of Congress have had to resort to “cramming things into bills” to have
“big, multidimensional deals.”163 However, simple legislation has its perks,
especially that it is “easier to understand.”164 As outlined above, extending and
enforcing PII protections for the legislative and executive branches would be
dealing with difficult policy areas – whether they are the complexities of the
executive branch security or the shortcomings of the Capitol Police as an
agency.165 Therefore, a better alternative – if members of Congress are adamant
to have legislation that extends the PII protection to themselves – is to have
separate bills specifically tailored to each branch of government. That would
mean passing the bill in the 117th Congress as originally drafted to protect federal
judges and their PII and drafting a separate bill to protect the members of
Congress in ways that they deem necessary at this time. This separate bill could
possibly include legislative needs following the January 6, 2021 insurrection of
the Capitol.
To be clear, this Note does not take the position that members of Congress
should not be extended PII protections and security at their homes. Rather, this
Note recognizes the need for increased legislative branch security and advocates
for a more unique approach that can accommodate the legislative branch’s
current position following January 6, 2021 and the Capitol Police’s failure to
protect as an agency. In the meantime, however, the fate of the judicial branch’s
security should not be placed in limbo.
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal judges have a right to privacy when it comes to their home addresses
– more specifically, the right to be left alone when they are in their homes. In a
nation that lacks a uniform and overarching framework of privacy laws, the
federal government must enact measures to protect the privacy of federal judges’
home addresses. Some federal judges and their families have been murdered

163 Danielle Kurtzleben, Just Because a Bill Is Long Doesn’t Mean It’s Bad, NPR (Mar. 11, 2017,
6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/11/519700465/when-it-comes-to-legislation-so
metimes-bigger-is-better.
164 Id.
165 This is not to say that there were not brave officers on January 6, 2020. See, e.g., N’dea
Yancey-Bragg, ‘Hero’ Capitol officer who led rioters away from Senate may get a Congressional Gold Medal,
USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2021, 12:37 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2021/01/15/eugene-goodman-capitol-police-officer-congressional-gold-medal/
4172650001/ (detailing how Officer Eugene Goodman led a mob of white men away from
the Senate floor). This Note, however, focuses on the Capitol Police’s unpreparedness as an
agency and the bad apples within it that directly contributed to the bloodshed that day.
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after revengeful individuals obtained access to their home addresses which are
made readily available through real estate records, data brokers, social media, or
people-search websites. Without the express permission of federal judges, their
home addresses must remain private, both for the sake of the rule of law and the
safety of federal judges and their families in an increasingly polarized and digital
age. The federal government can achieve this privacy by recognizing and
protecting federal judges’ home addresses as PII through an unamended version
of the Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act in the 117 th Congress. The
sooner, the better.
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